"What constitutes a good animal life from an ethical point of view?"
Table of contents
1.1 Introduction to Ethics, Bioethics and Morality2
1.2 Introduction to Philosophical Anthropology . 3
1.3 Introduction to Animal Ethics3
2. Different viewpoints on the moral treatment of animals4
3. What is a “good animal life”?5
5. Critical Summary
6. Bibliography
Table of contents:
Table 1 Reproduction…………………………………… ….…………………….8
Table 2 Nutrition……………………………………………… ……………….…...9
Table 3 Accommodation and shelter……………………….…….… ….10
Table 4 Explore……………………………………………………………… …. ….11
Table 5 Autonomy……………………………………………………… ….…12
Table 6 Point scale………………………………………………………….. ……13
Table 7 Anthropological Perspective……………………………… ……13
Table 8 Zoological View………………………………………………...……….13
Table 9 Discrepancy…………………………………………………...………….14
I'm sorry that some tables have lost their formatting, but the meaning can still be understood.
When people reflect on what constitutes a "good life," the answer is highly individual. Philosophy explores truths that apply equally to all people. The concept of happiness runs through all eras of history. Aristotle already questioned whether there is a goal to all action. The goal is the result of striving and thus the attainment of happiness, or, put another way, perfect contentment. According to Kant, it would be the liberation of all inclinations. The pursuit of happiness seems to be inherent in all people ( Höffe 1977 ) . Everyone also shares a similar structure of needs ( Gehlen 1957 ) . A happiness study at Harvard revealed that one of the most important conditions for living "happily" is having good relationships. The first conclusion often drawn by dying people is that one should stand by one's feelings and desires in order to achieve one's life goals ( Ware 2011 ) . The very reason for asking the question about a good life is often connected to a personal reflection on one's own life in old age. Happiness can also be understood as lucky coincidence or episodic luck (Wolf 1996). However, animals differ not only among their various species but also from humans on many different levels. The term "animals" encompasses all organisms from two-celled organisms to great apes. The definitions of biopsychic life include the characteristics of emotional drive, instincts, an associative memory, organically bound practical intelligence, and the physical body. Higher levels of development are associated with more abilities. But where do the abilities of being similar to humans, for example, capable of suffering or even empathy, begin? We can only draw conclusions from observations of their behavior and communication styles among themselves and also in their communication with us humans. The presence of nociceptors for pain perception and the similarity of the brain and other physiological characteristics allow for a comparison, essentially equating one's own feelings with those of animals ( Wild 2012 ) . Since we can only judge our own emotional and sensory worlds, our judgment can only be anthroposophically oriented. However, the physiological makeup is almost identical, so one can assume that the sensations are also the same. We do not know, and cannot fully comprehend, what a complex, different organism feels. We can only try to empathize, to the best of our current knowledge and conscience, with what an animal needs for its contentment ( Nagel 1974 ) . In other words, if one were to grant animals a striving for contentment beyond the biologically predetermined life-sustaining stimuli, what goals would these be? Is a good life solely measured by instinctive ways of life? What is the relationship between humans and animals, and are we morally obligated to enable animals to have a "good life" as well? This paper aims to determine, through the comparison of eight different animal groups (including humans), which animal life could be described as a "good animal life" from a philosophical perspective.
Ethics is an important subfield of philosophy. "What should I do?", "Why should I even be a 'good person'?", "When is a life a 'good life'?" are some of the essential questions. Moral questions are also ethical phenomena that arise whenever people of a particular group live together. Norms, standards, and commandments develop and are subject to tradition over time. Whether animals can also be ascribed moral behavior is currently being debated. Scientific methods are used to find justifications for moral behavior. This is the task of bioethics, which attempts, among other things, to justify how we should treat animals and other living organisms and their environment. The preference utilitarian Peter Singer also attributes inherent value and thus dignity to animals ( Singer 2009 ) , which would mean that animals deserve respect.
One cannot discuss the ethical aspects of an animal's life without defining what a human being is and what their relationship to life and to animals is. Philosophical anthropology deals with methodological approaches within the empirical human sciences ( Lorenz 1992 ) . Here, too, there are differing viewpoints. The definition of the concept of "person," when, why, and how we act, is the domain of anthropologists. In attempting to describe what it means to be human, various philosophers often use animals as a point of comparison. For example, Aristotle states that the actions of animals are based on instinctual drives, while humans are self-determined, meaning they can weigh and determine their own actions ( Wolf Oct. 2020 ) . Uexküll also takes a similar approach, arguing that animals, with their specialized sensory organs, perceive only the part of their environment that is relevant to them and are therefore dependent on that environment ( Uexküll 1935 ) , whereas humans are capable of adapting to any kind of environment. Like animals, humans also have a basic structure of needs. Personality develops through high exemplary value and self-awareness, which enables one to take a position on oneself. Only when one can take a stand on oneself can personal decisions be made. ( Plessner 2017 )
Animal ethics is a subfield of bioethics. Here, the animal is the central focus regarding human moral action. In what form, and indeed whether, are we even permitted to inflict suffering, pain, or harm on animals? It is striking that laws for the welfare of animals, such as the German Animal Welfare Act and its guidelines, or the Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), do not specify which rights are granted to animals or whether and how they should be treated. Rather, these laws are a compilation of regulations concerning how, who, and when animals may be killed, and the criminal consequences of non-compliance. Furthermore, criteria are defined to evaluate the extent to which actions serve the protection of the species. However, the question of whether these actions might not even be permissible due to the inherent dignity of the animal ( Bentham 1789 ) is not addressed .
Whether animals lead a "good life" depends largely on how we treat them. From a philosophical perspective, three positions are currently held regarding the treatment of animals, depending on the moral status one wishes to ascribe to them. There is a spectrum between attributing the same morality to animals as to humans, in which case the animal would consequently have to be defined as a person, or denying them any morality whatsoever and thus also any claim to dignity.
The Animal Welfare Act , which describes animals as fellow creatures and therefore sentient beings, represents a more moderate anthropocentrism and grants animals a moral status but no rights. Thus, it allows suffering, pain, and harm to be inflicted on animals as sentient beings for a "reasonable reason." This reasonable reason is not clearly defined and is criticized as being a synonym that could also be interpreted as an economic imperative. After all, the production of animal products very often involves killing the animals. The position taken here is that anthropocentric animal welfare is an indirect form of animal protection that does not aim to protect the animal but rather prioritizes human advantage. We differentiate only between the severity of animal testing and the husbandry practices of our feeder animals, attempting to prevent suffering and harm through various regulations. Nevertheless, death remains the ultimate outcome.
Animal testing and the use of animals for food are only made possible by a "reasonable cause." Both demonstrate that killing animals is defined as right for humans. However, moral equality, and thus genuine protection for animals, can only arise if animals are also granted animal rights, such as the right to life.
For the absolute animal liberation position, this speciesism constitutes moral discrimination. It is based on abolitionism (the abolition of slavery). For this position, there is no longer any justifiable reason for the difference between animals and humans. Therefore, the immediate liberation of all animals, and thus the abolition of any keeping or consumption of animals, must follow. There also seems to be a moral reversal. While death is considered the worst thing that can happen to a human being, suffering, rather than death, is seen as more valuable to animals. This pathocentric position is not concerned with preserving life, but primarily with preventing suffering and harm ( Krebs 1997 ) .
Parallel to this, there exists the metaethical demand for consideration of interests. Here, the interest of "willing to live" is central. It is also debated whether this interest can be attributed not only to animals but also to plants. For Kant, animals are not rational beings and consequently do not deserve morality or moral protection. However, even for Kant, killing and torturing animals is socially reprehensible. It could indicate a cruelty that, once inflicted on animals, could also be inflicted on other humans. Therefore, in order not to become cruel oneself, every person should treat animals well ( Kant 1903 ) . Schopenhauer's contractualism, on the other hand, demands an equality between animals and humans based on empathy and the resulting compassion. However, he also states that one can only act morally if one possesses morality. Therefore, for him, compassion remains the sole altruistic argument ( Schopenhauer 1977 ) . ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Schopenhauer</Author><Year>1977</Year><RecNum>40</RecNum><DisplayText>(Schopenhauer 1977)</DisplayText><record><rec-number>40</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="vvwrfvxvtxe55gepeewverf0t2d2drs2szvf" timestamp="1637686198">40</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Arthur Schopenhauer</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Über die Grundlage der Moral</title></titles><dates><year>1977</year></dates><publisher>Manfred-Pawlak-Taschenbuch-Verlagsgesellschaft mbH</publisher><isbn>3822411787</isbn><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>
Assuming that the perceptions of humans and higher animals are nearly identical, this results in basic needs such as reproduction, the desire for one's own habitat and protective home, the satisfaction of hunger and thirst, and the fulfillment of curiosity as an indicator of intelligence. This also includes the ability to pursue these goals autonomously, meaning that one can freely decide at any time when to seek or hunt for food, with whom to mate, when to eat, when to sleep, and whether the fulfillment of these goals is experienced as happiness or as a sense of satisfaction. The biologically motivated basic needs and their autonomous fulfillment are the prerequisites for comparison in all higher living beings.
In ethology, instinct is explained as an innate behavior triggered by key stimuli that do not need to be learned. These stimuli serve survival and are always adapted to the specific environment, remaining consistent within individual species. Behaviorism largely rejects this theory ( Watson 1913 ) . Unlike instinctive actions, behaviorism presupposes a reaction to a stimulus as the basis for behavior ( Skinner 1968 ) . Considering the increasing body of knowledge about the potential empathic abilities of animals, their capacity to suffer, and their ability to experience contentment or pleasure, I would like to attempt a comparison. This comparison aims to differentiate the quality of life based on the various foundations of existence for animal groups and thus determine whether, and under what circumstances, animals lead a "good life."
To determine concordance, a scientific comparative method using a point system is applied. Five of the most important criteria for a satisfying life, which point to the fulfillment of biologically based life goals, are compared (reproduction, food, shelter, the urge to explore, and self-determination). The satisfaction points, awarded on a scale of 0-3, thus represent a global assessment of happiness based on biologically based life goals in higher species . For animals, six different husbandry systems are compared (animals in the wild, in factory farming, in animal welfare-oriented food production, in laboratory settings, zoos and species conservation programs, and private pets). Humans are included and compared with and without deprivation of liberty. The points are awarded twice for each animal group: once from an anthropological perspective and once from a zoological perspective, i.e., a purely hypothetical one for the animal groups in question. Finally, based on the total satisfaction points, it is assessed which group leads a "good life" from a human perspective and whether this view correlates with the (estimated) view of the animals. The worst result is 0 points, representing an unsatisfied, i.e., unhappy life, while the highest achievable goal, i.e., perfect satisfaction, would be the highest score of 15 points per group .
Table 1Desire for Reproduction
1) Anthropological perspective points, 2) Zoological perspective point
|
AP 1 |
Reason |
ZP 2 |
Reason |
||
|
a |
Animals living in the wild |
2 |
Species-specifically bound to sometimes limited habitats |
2 |
Finding food when hungry or thirsty is more difficult and associated with suffering. |
|
b |
Animals in captivity for food production, factory farming |
1 |
Monotonous, medication added, feed geared towards profit. |
0 |
Eats only because of hunger |
|
c |
Animals in captivity for food production, taking animal welfare into account. |
2 |
Adapted to the species, high quality but not autonomously chosen |
3 |
Species-appropriate feed from organic farming |
|
d |
Animals used as experimental animals |
2 |
Standardization, without regard for individual taste, high-quality ingredients |
3 |
They know nothing else! |
|
e |
Animals in zoos and species conservation programs |
2 |
High quality, varied but not autonomously chosen |
3 |
They do not know freedom, experience feeding as a joy, are unaware of alternatives, and sometimes roam freely. |
|
f |
Domesticated pets |
2 |
Malnutrition occurs |
3 |
Food is often seen as a life goal, a reward, treats! |
|
G |
People living in freedom
|
2 |
Localized famines, unequal distribution |
||
|
G |
People deprived of their liberty (prison) |
1 |
Not self-determined, sufficient |
||
1) Anthropological perspective points, 2) Zoological perspective points
Table of 3wishes for accommodation and protection
1) Anthropological perspective points, 2) Zoological perspective points
Table 4 Exploring and Researching Curiosity
|
AP 1 |
Reason |
ZP 2 |
Reason |
||
|
a |
Animals living in the wild |
3 |
Despite the lack of habitats, explorations are possible. |
3 |
Exploring the environment unrestricted |
|
b |
Animals in captivity for food production, factory farming |
0 |
External stimuli are blocked out. |
0 |
Close stance |
|
c |
Animals in captivity for food production, taking animal welfare into account. |
2 |
Despite limited captivity, attempts to provide variety and free-range access. |
3 |
Free run |
|
d |
Animals used as experimental animals |
0 |
Standardized posture, no new sensory experiences, no toys |
1 |
Instinctive exploration of new cages, keeping the keepers occupied |
|
e |
Animals in zoos and species conservation programs |
2 |
Despite limited captivity, attempts to provide variety and free-range access. |
2 |
Partial free-roaming, toys for enrichment, wild-caught animals suffer, behavioral disorders |
|
f |
Domesticated pets |
2 |
Depending on the person in charge |
2 |
Dissatisfaction due to neglect and monotony |
|
G |
People living in freedom
|
3 |
Due to high intelligence, a strong drive for research and idea development; explores every habitat. |
||
|
h |
People deprived of their liberty (prison) |
1 |
Dependent on external input. Monotony. |
||
1) Anthropological perspective points, 2) Zoological perspective points
Table 5Autonomy Lifespan
|
organisms |
AP 1 |
Reason |
ZP 2 |
Reason |
|
|
a |
Animals living in the wild |
2 |
Limited by predators and disease |
3 |
Autonomous despite sudden end due to predator |
|
b |
Animals in captivity for food production, factory farming |
1 |
Not autonomous, lifespan greatly shortened, hidden from public view |
0 |
Fear and stress leading to death, the smell of blood in slaughterhouses, and cries of panic. |
|
c |
Animals in captivity for food production, taking animal welfare into account. |
2 |
Lifespan greatly shortened but of high quality, slaughter on site, decisions possible |
2 |
Unaware of sudden death, connection to the farmer, autonomy possible with free range |
|
d |
Animals used as experimental animals |
0 |
Experiments under various stresses, death at every age range |
1 |
Unaware of sudden death, loss of autonomy through standardization and experiments |
|
e |
Animals in zoos and species conservation programs |
2 |
Partly fulfilled, but not autonomously chosen. |
2 |
Partial free range, toys for play |
|
f |
Domesticated pets |
3 |
Lives with handlers for their entire life |
2 |
Subject to the will of the "owners" |
|
G |
People living in freedom
|
3 |
Lifespan strongly dependent on place of birth, autonomy limited by financial means, wars Nevertheless, most people live self-determined and long lives. |
||
|
h |
People deprived of their liberty (prison) |
1 |
The death penalty is permitted in many parts of the world, Self-determination is very limited |
||
1) Anthropological perspective points, 2) Zoological perspective points
Table of 6results scale and interpretation
|
Result: 0 points |
without moments of happiness |
accident |
|
1-5 points |
almost uneventful |
rather unfortunate |
|
6-10 points |
small moments of happiness |
Mediocre luck |
|
11-14 points |
sufficient moments of happiness |
good life |
|
15 points |
Perfect happiness |
good life |
Table 7 : Satisfaction results from an anthroposophical perspective
|
Question 1 |
Question 2 |
Question 3 |
Question 4 |
Question 5 |
sum |
|
|
a |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
11 |
|
b |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
|
c |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
|
d |
2 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
|
e |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
|
f |
1 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
|
G |
3 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
13 |
|
h |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
Table 8: Results - Points from a zoological perspective
|
group |
Question 1 |
Question 2 |
Question 3 |
Question 4 |
Question 5 |
sum |
|
a |
3 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
14 |
|
b |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
c |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
13 |
|
d |
1 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
|
e |
2 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
|
f |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
Table 9 Discrepancy in viewpoints
|
group |
AP 1 |
ZP 2 |
Anthropological perspective Life evaluation |
Zoological perspective Life evaluation |
|
Sum a (living freely) |
11 |
14 |
A good life, borderline sufficient moments of happiness. |
Good life, Enough moments of contentment for a good life |
|
Sum b (factory farming) |
3 |
0 |
Very few moments of happiness, rather an unhappy life |
Misfortune!!! A bad life |
|
Sum c (Animal welfare farmers) |
10 |
13 |
Mediocre moments of happiness, a moderately satisfying life |
Good life, Enough moments of contentment for a good life |
|
Sum of d (Laboratory animals) |
5 |
9 |
Very few moments of happiness, rather an unhappy life |
Mediocre moments of happiness, a moderately satisfying life |
|
Total e (Zoos and species conservation programs ) |
10 |
11 |
Mediocre moments of happiness, a moderately satisfying life |
Good life, Enough moments of contentment for a good life |
|
Sum f (Pets) |
11 |
9 |
Good life, Enough moments of contentment for a good life |
Mediocre moments of happiness, a moderately satisfying life |
|
Total g (People free) |
13 |
|
Good life, Enough moments of contentment for a good life |
|
|
Total h (Human captivity) |
4 |
|
Very few moments of happiness, rather an unhappy life |
|
1) Anthropological perspective points, 2) Zoological perspective points
The maximum score of 3 points could not always be awarded because the distribution of resources in an increasingly scarce habitat no longer allows for a completely fulfilling, autonomous life in large parts of the world, and therefore compromises must be made, not only for animals but for all living beings. The percentage of habitat on our planet reserved for wild animals has been estimated at just 4%. Human reproduction is not limited but is constantly increasing. Mass extinctions affect almost all species. The Universe 25 experiment ( Armbruster 2020 ) shows that when there is insufficient space for social species, exclusion from society always leads first to social death, followed by physical death. The highest score I could assign to a good life was achieved for wild animals (a), domestic animals (e), and free-living humans (g). Wild animals, in particular, still have the opportunity to live completely or largely autonomously and shape their own lives, provided sufficient habitat remains. From the animals' perspective, even pets, although their autonomy is limited by humans, are candidates for a good life because they know no other life and, in the vast majority of cases, are considered part of a human family. Compared to humans, the "good life" of animals is even more highly valued because humans are aware of a different, perhaps better, life, and desires can easily arise. Among wild animals, there is no striving for ever greater things, if one excludes the mating season and thus the courtship of sexually reproducing animals, because without a doubt, every male or female in that environment wants to be the best. Rational action like that which humans are capable of is only possible to a very limited extent for animals.
From an anthropological perspective, an unhappy life is achieved in factory farming and in the keeping of laboratory animals (c and d). However, a very important aspect regarding laboratory animals is that they are only very rarely, and with special permission, wild-caught and must be born in a suitable facility specifically for animal testing. From the perspective of this group of animals, no other free life is desirable. The possibility of their lives being lived in freedom can only be understood in relation to the space outside the cage. This, along with individual actions such as fresh food and handling by staff, or even in experiments that do not cause stress (variety to counter monotony), results in moments of contentment, in contrast to factory farming, where the animals suffer due to the cramped conditions and the inability to fulfill all their needs.
In contrast, humans are aware of what they deprive animals of, aside from drastically shortening their lifespans. This creates a moral dilemma that could only be resolved by granting animals rights. The question also arises: are we justified in treating animals in this way when they are unaware of their own situation? Currently, from a moderate anthropological perspective, we answer this question with "yes." ( Animal Welfare Act 1972 )
Animals bred in zoos, conservation programs, and on farms for food production that prioritize animal welfare lead, from an anthropological perspective, almost satisfactory lives. Although their lives are shortened for food, they experience a fairly good life until their death. From the animals' point of view, even a very good one. This is because the animals are unaware of their impending death ( Heidegger 1927 ) . To prevent the animals from experiencing fear, panic, or suffering, it is necessary that death be sudden and unexpected. This means without slaughterhouses and the often agonizing transport routes and smell of blood associated with them . This quick, unexpected death is practiced in animal laboratories, as well as on farms that prioritize the highest possible animal welfare and slaughter on-site. However, even if the animals are largely well cared for, the notion that we need to eat meat for a healthy diet has been disproven. We could therefore completely forgo meat farming. In contrast, there are not enough alternative methods that could completely replace animal experimentation ( Wolf 2008 ) . In industrial slaughterhouses, up to 80 cattle, 750 pigs, and more than 10,000 chickens are slaughtered per hour.
Due to human intelligence, the act of depriving animals of their freedom is not morally as reprehensible as the imprisonment of humans, who, due to their capacity for suffering, are hardly able to consider a life of unfreedom as a good life. However, humans are capable of giving meaning to their lives even under adverse circumstances ( Heidegger 1927 ) .
All species, including humans, live in their own, and perhaps even individually experienced, sensory world. Attempting to judge when another species leads a good life can only be a guess, which, due to ignorance, may lead entirely astray. Assuming that all animals also pursue a life interest and possess an inviolable dignity, as Kant ascribes only to humans—that is, possess intrinsic value—the consequence would be that the Earth and its resources would have to be left to all species in their specific habitats or shared. While a human right to intervene in all other natural life exists theologically (in the Bible), it cannot be otherwise justified. As a result, the law of the natural cycle of predator or prey would prevail, and life itself could not be judged as easy. However, it could be considered a "good life" because it would be lived autonomously, in accordance with the species' needs and interests. Human beings, acting (also) through reason, would have to recognize, upon abandoning their selfish attitude towards all life, that space on Earth is limited and therefore must curb their own reproduction beyond a certain point. Otherwise, a good life would no longer be possible for humanity. Our current status of a good life results from the exploitation of all other living beings and resources.
The special case of "domesticated pets" is most often confronted with the fact that, under well-intentioned animal welfare legislation, they suffer from an anthropological perspective, as beings that are valued as family members or sometimes "toys." This suffering is seen as a consequence of "knowing better." These species stand out in a particularly significant way. This often results in separate protective legislation to grant these animals "special" protection, which is denied to other species because they cannot be kept as pets. In my personal experience, the most controversial discussion doesn't arise from criticism of animal testing, but rather from the assertion that dogs need other dogs, not humans. In all animal species that live in a socially structured group, the animal joins humans as a substitute for the animal community (pack, herd). The fact that the dog voluntarily joined humans is a popular argument here and is interpreted as meaning that it willingly gave up its "dog life" without humans. Dog daycares, dog schools, dog clothing, nutritional advice, dog wellness and physiotherapy, dog therapy, and specialized veterinarians who treat only dogs demonstrate this special status in Germany (cultural differences). From a normative perspective, most people would want to grant dogs the status of a person, but probably less so corvids or great apes. Thus, the traditional small dog would become a brother or sister to the child.
If animals are unable to grasp what they are missing in an artificial world created specifically for them by humans, and their lives proceed contentedly as a result, this way of life could still be considered "good" for them. However, our current moderate anthropocentric perspective allows not only this artificially created way of life for animals, but also factory farming, which we permit for our own benefit despite knowing better. More and more people are calling for an end to this suffering. From a normative point of view, it is reasonable to assume that this meat production will eventually be completely banned. In retrospect, we may wonder, compared to the abolition of slavery, how factory farming ever existed and how it could have happened. Given the population explosion, the consequence must be that we largely abstain from eating meat. The "good life" of animals is only possible if humans enable it. Due to scarce or completely destroyed habitats, animals and humans will soon no longer be able to exist separately, but will share the same habitat with us in many areas. If we don't accept this, it will lead to another human-initiated mass extinction of species. A good animal life is therefore not only good if it can be lived freely, but also if it includes sufficient moments of contentment. Suffering is also part of a fulfilling life. For how could one feel joy over a hunted and killed delicacy if food were plentiful? In this case, one person's joy is another's sorrow. This paper has only compared the five most important aspects. Social interactions are also enormously important for a "good life." Based on the described need structures, interspecies communication must also be mentioned. For example, we are able to invite animals to play, and vice versa. In my opinion, "understanding" another species is the most essential part of animal welfare, which will increasingly grant animals more rights. Due to ever-new insights and the recognition of an emotional world very similar to our own, an ethical obligation arises to treat animals not only as fellow creatures, but as compassionate beings.
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